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Introduction
Genocide can be defined as a complex process of systematic persecution and annihilation of a group of people by a government. In the twentieth century, approximately
40 to 60 million defenseless people became victims of deliberate genocidal policies.
The twenty-first century did not begin much better, with genocidal episodes going
on in Darfur and the Congo. We can speak of genocide when individuals are persecuted and murdered merely on the basis of their presumed or imputed membership
in a group rather than on their individual characteristics or participation in certain
acts. Although it makes little sense to define genocide by a specific number of victims
affected by it, we can state that a genocidal process always concerns a society at
large and that genocide destroys a significant and often critical part of the affected
community. It can be argued that genocidal processes are particularly malicious and
destructive because they are directed against all members of a group, most often
against innocent and defenseless people who are persecuted and killed regardless of
their behaviour. Genocide always denotes a colossal and brutal collective criminality.
For this reason, genocide has been studied as a modern phenomenon that is distinct
from other forms of mass violence. After Raphael Lemkin died in 1959, the term
seemed to be a dead letter. But in the 1970s historians and social scientists rediscovered the concept and published the first academic work on genocide. Since then,
the number of publications has grown and today genocide studies, with journals
and research institutes in North America and Europe, is a respectable intellectual
specialism.1
Three questions are central in this research field. First, what are the causes of
a genocidal process? Or, put another way, how does the systematic destruction of
a group of people begin? Second, how does a genocidal process develop? There are
strong indications that, when such a process has been put in motion, it develops
its own dynamic. How does that process evolve from the individual to the collective
level? Finally, it is important to investigate the consequences of genocide. How are
perpetrators, victims, and third parties affected by genocide? How do they process,
if at all, the traumatic events? In the growing, interdisciplinary field of genocide
studies much useful research has been conducted into the evolution of separate genocides such as the destruction of Ottoman Armenians in 1915, the Holocaust, and the
genocides in Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia during
the Yugoslav civil wars. A significant amount of knowledge about certain aspects of
genocide exists as well. Both separate and comparative research has been conducted,
for instance, on the turn of a fairly ‘‘normal’’ civil society into a persecutory one, the
motives of the ordinary people who are involved in mass murders, the power and
effect of charismatic leaders, and aspects of violence as they relate to gender. From
time to time, publications appear trying to understand the causes of genocide in
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order to integrate that knowledge into policy mechanisms aimed at the prevention
of genocide. Such a report, MARO: Mass Atrocity Response Operations; A Military
Planning Handbook, was published by the US army and attempts to build on this
tradition.

MARO: Fallacies, Missteps, Naiveté
It is important for military personnel across the world to understand genocidal situations. Clusters of perpetrators need to be told that they can be held accountable for
their actions and that the old excuse of ‘‘orders are orders’’ (Befehl ist Befehl) is not
exculpatory. It is crucial for intervention forces to recognize a genocidal situation
because of the nature and purpose of their work. For example, during the separation
of Muslim men from women and children in Srebrenica, the Dutch UN officials
should have immediately understood that this action was a pernicious omen if not
a direct indicator of mass murder to come. Historically, the gender segregation of
groups of unarmed civilians has not led to the containment or de-escalation of
the conflict; in fact, it has served little other purpose than further destruction. For
this reason, in principle, a handbook such as MARO is a laudable effort. However,
genocide is a political act, not one that can be simply understood and tackled
through a purely military prism. Most of the handbook’s flaws emanate from its
inability to integrate the political dimension of genocide into its report. In the
analysis that follows I will confront this report with existing genocide theory as well
as several concrete scenarios.
There are some bizarre passages in the handbook. For example, when discussing
victims the report states the obvious: ‘‘Victims will probably require significant
humanitarian assistance and will likely desire to return to their land, seek justice and/
or retribution against the perpetrators, and gain knowledge of what happened to family
members or acquaintances who may have disappeared during the crisis.’’ 2 More
importantly, the handbook insufficiently discusses the problem of state sovereignty.
For example, the handbook develops the idea that decisions need to be made ‘‘whether
to target, pursue, or prosecute perpetrators, which potentially could mean that the
MTF [MARO Task Force] would need to attack the HN [host nation] military or
government’’ (60). Does this mean that the United States, in an effort to stop
genocide in Darfur, would declare war on Sudan—a major ally of China? Or would
an elite unit in a helicopter secretly land in Khartoum, sneak into the presidential
palace, and assassinate Omar Al-Bashir? This scenario is taken straight from the
latest Rambo film, in which Stallone and a clutch of mercenaries infiltrate the
Burmese jungle and liberate a group of victims. In other words, the ambitions laid
out in this handbook challenge the imagination of the social scientist.
Having worked on genocide perpetrators in my past research, I wish to present
some thoughts on the report’s (mis)understanding of perpetration.3 The obvious
example is paramilitarism. According to the report, perpetrators are a clearly definable,
easily identifiable group of killers. But comparative research into the involvement
of paramilitary units in mass crimes, such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, demonstrates that governments benefit from relying on paramilitary groups as they provide
governments with plausible deniability for the violence that units commit against
targeted populations. The regime can simply disavow any linkage with the paramilitary organizations by claiming that they operated on their own volition.4 This model
fits virtually every case of genocide in the twentieth century. Although the report
acknowledges the different types of perpetrators (paramilitaries, military, top state
elites, and so forth), it fails to recognize the fundamentally different political contexts
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in which they operate. Intervening in a situation where a breakaway rebel group
is persecuting a group in a limited territory requires following entirely different
procedures than a situation in which the very political top is involved in the organization of violence (44–45). Deploying a well-armed force to stop massacres against
Banyamulenge civilians in the Eastern Congo may be relatively easy. After all, the
Congo is a failed state in an advanced stage of decomposition and its resistance as
host nation might be negligible. But there are three not unrealistic scenarios for
future conflict. All of the three examples to follow build on recent violent events
that captured the attention of newspaper readers throughout the world.
The first example is China’s persecution of the Uighur population of Xinjiang.
The ongoing marginalization and persecutions, the Uighur reaction and riots, and
the ensuing backlash by the government have demonstrated that violence against
civilians is not considered a serious transgression by the Chinese government.
Should the persecution increase intensively as well as extensively into collective
dispossession, displacement, and the murder of elites, China’s Uighurs would face
extremely bleak prospects. During the riots in early July 2009 more than 100
Uighurs were killed, 1,700 injured, and an unknown number ‘‘disappeared.’’ What
is particularly relevant is that the Chinese government did not only arrest and
imprison Uighurs in Urumqi (where the riots had taken place), but also in other
cities including Kashgar.5 This potentially signifies ethno-categorical thinking by
the Chinese security forces, which constitutes a serious and radical development.
After these arrests and killings, no amount of protest from NGOs or governments
made a serious impact on the Chinese government’s policies in regards to the Uighurs.
A second example comes from the Gaza Strip. In a wide-ranging comparative
study of ethnic cleansing, Michael Mann included the Palestinians, especially those
in the Gaza Strip, in a select group of victimized communities that are facing a slow
but imminent process of persecution and drifting in the long term toward critical
decline if not destruction.6 A recent example of asymmetrical violence in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict is the 2008 to 2009 Gaza Winter War. The UN report produced
by Richard Goldstone concluded that Hamas committed violations of the laws of war
and other war crimes and that the Israeli army had used disproportionate force,
targeting Palestinian civilians and destroying civilian infrastructure. The war ended
in the very asymmetrical body count of 1,417 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths.7
To any dispassionate scholar of mass violence, these figures and the dynamic of
the violence must be interpreted as unmistakable signs of an escalating counterinsurgency potentially heading toward catastrophe. The issue is not so much the discriminatory population policies of the Israeli government—these measures are being
sharply criticized and satirized in Israeli society. The real issue is the asymmetry of
violence, which can polarize even further.8
The final example comes from Chechnya. Whether under Russian imperial or
federal rule, from a long-term perspective, the North Caucasus has been a thorn in
the side of Russian political elites.9 The March 2010 suicide bombings in the Moscow
subway sparked a sharp radicalization of a conflict that has been lingering since the
eruption of the first war in 1994. On the part of the Chechens, the ruthlessness of
these attacks also denotes an awareness of the asymmetrical nature of the conflict,
a sense of collective despair, an acceptance of blind revenge, and a lack of belief in
future prospects of mutual reconciliation, conflict de-escalation, and societal integration. This conflict escalated to such an extent that in May 2001 the Committee
on Conscience of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum placed Chechnya
on its Genocide Alert list.10 Here too, the asymmetry of the conflict is striking:
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although the Chechen rebels targeted both Russian soldiers and civilians, the total
losses they suffered far exceed those of the Russian military campaign. In a comparative study of ethnic cleansing, Norman Naimark expressed fear that Chechnya
may be on the brink of genocide if the conflicts in the Caucasus deepen.11
In all three cases, a militarily and politically superior state attacked a vulnerable
minority that included not only political elites (whatever their political colouring)
but many civilians as well. In all three cases, recent conflagrations fit in a pattern
of long-term disempowerment and persecution from the early- and mid-twentieth
century. Now, if we believe MARO, there are several strategies to tackle these cases
successfully: saturation, oil spot, separation, safe areas, partner enabling, containment, defeat perpetrators (70–85). How would future escalations in similar scenarios
be stopped? Turn Gaza into a safe area after the flotilla scene? Deploy forces in
Urumqi and use the method of the oil spot? (Operation Deepwater Horizon?) Demilitarize the Caucasus, a major source of Russia’s internal and external security policy?
None of these constraints and problems is discussed in a satisfactory way in the
handbook. In Annex F (‘‘Intelligence Considerations’’), the handbook does, however,
pose questions for the ‘‘intelligence personnel to assist their analysis of the MARO
environment’’ (118). Let us consider these questions in a hypothetical, but not
unthinkable, new phase of a serious escalation of mass violence in Chechnya:
1. Who are the perpetrators?
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev
2. Where are they located?
The Kremlin
3. How are they organized?
In the Russian domestic secret service, FSB, which has eleven departments
and directorates
4. What are their usual modes of operation?
Counterintelligence, counter-terrorism, border protection, export control
5. What are their capabilities and vulnerabilities?
They are capable of anything and vulnerable to little.
6. What are their objectives and ideology?
‘‘[We will] eliminate them [terrorists] like rats.’’ 12
7. What are their recent and current activities?
Appointing Ramzan Kadyrov as President of Chechnya and unconditionally
endorsing his policies of murder, extortion, embezzlement, intimidation, rape,
forced disappearance, torture, and other acts of violence against civilians
8. What support mechanisms exist to sustain their operations?
Spetsnaz and organized crime
9. What are their possible courses of action and which of these will likely be
taken?
Burn villages, massacre civilians, bomb buildings, and destroy property.
10. What is the level of government complicity with the perpetrators?
Full
11. Are there any divisions among the perpetrators?
Not anymore
The tragicomic absurdity of the situation is clear: the handbook does not offer a
serious and credible way of intervening in possible escalations of real crises.
Another important issue is the relationship between domestic support (i.e.,
political will) and foreign policy. Nowhere in the report is there any discussion of
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the relationship between American political dynamics and a MARO. How will the
use of funds be justified to the population or to parliament? Moreover, there is no
sensible explanation of how a MARO would function in the case that an ally of the
United States would commit mass atrocities. Mann has argued that ‘‘the United
States is currently intervening on the side of dominant states against their ethnicreligious insurgents. From Palestine to Georgia, to Chechnya, to Kashmir, to the
southern Philippines, to Colombia, U.S. policy favors state terrorists.’’ 13 Without a
critical discussion of this problem, one cannot take the handbook seriously.

Conclusion
Two proverbs and a quote capture the essence of MARO. To begin with, a German
proverb suits the handbook well: ‘‘Well meant is not always well done’’ (Gut gemeint
ist nicht immer gut gemacht). Although the handbook means well, it commits the sin
of utter naı̈veté in its assumptions and hence also in its conclusions. Secondly, reading it immediately invokes the Turkish proverb ‘‘Calculations at home won’t match
the market’’ (Evdeki hesap çarşıya uymaz) or Moltke the Elder’s famous saying
‘‘No battle plan survives contact with the enemy.’’ In other words, if we believe the
handbook, the eight scenarios outlined in MARO are predictable and will seamlessly
conform to conditions on the ground. All in all, the handbook cannot see the forest
for the trees. It is full of excessive detail and out of touch with reality. It might
have been much more useful to take real historical or current events and analyze
them in light of two or three potential future developments. What we need is not
a desk fantasy about how to curb hypothetical ‘‘mass atrocities’’ but (a) credible
argumentation linking military planning with international politics and (b) thorough
analysis of existing genocidal processes, such as Darfur. For instance, the failures of
the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia during the Kosovo War—the bombing escalated
the atrocities rather than stopped them—could have been scrutinized carefully. But,
instead, the handbook very briefly refers to airpower only at the end and does not
seriously consider it as a form of action.
MARO is also ridden with obscure jargon, vague abstractions, incredible non
sequiturs, caricatural acronyms you forget after a few paragraphs, fictional scenarios
seemingly drawn from a computer game, ambitious flowcharts that only serve to
elicit roaring laughter, and naı̈ve assumptions about international relations. One
can read page after page and still not understand what the report intends to convey
to the reader or where it is heading in general. Some passages are worthwhile, but
further probing demonstrates that it is difficult to intellectually engage with this
naı̈ve military-planning document for genocide prevention because genocide is
embedded in political structures. In order to verify the military recommendations
and commentary in the handbook, one likely needs to approach military sociologists
for their expert opinions.
An unforgivable sin that the handbook commits is that it searches for that
one single solution that will serve as a panacea for all evil, a deus ex machina that
will intervene and stop genocide. Ultimately, this will accomplish the utopia of
a genocide-free world. This is an ideology that ignores the pragmatic arguments
marshalled by specialists in the field of conflict prevention.14 Unfortunately, more
realistic and sober accounts of genocide recognize that such an elixir does not exist.
We need to recognize that political violence will continue to play a part within and
between human societies. As Jacques Sémelin has reminded us in his penetrating
study of genocide, ‘‘We are really going down the road of formulating a superbly
pious wish: because conflict is obviously inherent in the history of man, and so any
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intention to prevent it is doomed to fail from the start.’’ 15 No early-warning system,
preventive diplomacy, rapid response unit, structural prevention, MARO, or other
well-meant effort can fully extinguish our potential for mass violence.
The handbook ties in with many themes in Daniel Goldhagen’s recent documentary film with the dubious title Worse than War. (Apropos, really? Is genocide worse
than war? In other words, if I would write a book on the enormous destruction of
human lives and property wrought by a war, would I title it Better than Genocide?)
In the film, Goldhagen ignores the thorny issue of state sovereignty and travels
across the world to preach American military invasion as the most effective form
of genocide prevention. As in the book with the same title, the documentary does
not deploy any dynamic political science model but uses static binaries of bad guys
versus good guys. Destroying the bad guys will pave the way for the genocide-free,
multiethnic Walhalla to which we aspire. This is a complete failure to recognize the
fact that there is a lot that we do not understand about mass murder yet. The film
compensates for this lack of intellectual sophistication with an overdose of moralistic
indignation about the phenomenon rather than dispassionate reflection. (Moreover,
the documentary grossly exaggerates the supposed threats that emanate from
Muslim parts of the world and from current Islamist terrorism. Ironically, in the
three examples provided above, it is mostly Muslims who are living under threat of
collective victimization.)
Viewed from this broader perspective, MARO truly seems to be a reflection of
its time and political culture. Well-intentioned do-gooders in the West often do not
grasp the complexity of the many processes that occur during genocide. They insufficiently recognize the difficulty of being able to grasp, let alone control, the international minefield of states and the outcome of this constellation. The handbook’s
reasoning denotes a certain blind belief in the formability of the world through a
series of measures that can shape the future. Its credibility, however, is critically
undermined by the authors’ naı̈ve views on global power relations. The authors
believe in a world in which everything is feasible and they have answers to every
possible human problem. The handbook suffers from a lack of modesty and instead
surrenders to a blind conviction in the otherwise laudable goal of genocide prevention. Most of all, the authors also turn a blind eye to the politics of a MARO itself.
Will not such a phenomenon become the object of political manipulation? And what
if American forces are the ones committing the atrocities?
Nothing epitomizes this intransigence better than the last scenario described
in MARO, ‘‘Defeat the Perpetrator.’’ Under this heading, the handbook actually
includes the reference ‘‘Iraq 2003 model.’’ With the 106,035 civilian deaths in Iraq
in mind,16 one can hardly be surprised that the US army has produced a report this
credulous. Surely its annual budget of more than $660 billion could be spent in a
more prudent way. All in all, the handbook fails to understand that in the international state system states are allied and profoundly interconnected to each other
through a series of economic, political, and security interests. Intervention into the
interests of one state means manipulation or influence of other states’ interests as
well. The simplistic thought processes deployed in this handbook fail to convince
this reader of its usefulness in an intervention in a genocidal process.
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